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Abstract
We analyze the hitherto unstudied duopolistic interaction between a new good producer and
a remanufacturer who compete for a dominant share of the market for a particular product. Each
firm  spends  on product development to sway consumers and this expenditure increases the
likelihood that firm  captures a dominant market share. The revenue to each firm from obtaining
a dominant market share is  Our analysis of this interaction leads to five results. First, given the
two product development expenditures  we specify the expected profit for each firm 
Second, we describe the function that characterizes each firm’s best response function. Third, we
compute the unique Nash equilibrium. Fourth, we show what happens to this Nash equilibrium when
the revenue  increases. Finally, we study what happens to the Nash equilibrium when the
remanufacturer’s revenue from capturing a dominant market share is still  but the new good
producer’s revenue is  where  
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1. Introduction
1.1. Preliminaries
The term “remanufacturing” refers to an industrial process in which worn-out products are
restored to like-new condition. As noted by Lund (1984), in remanufacturing, a series of industrial
processes, often occurring in a factory environment, leads to the complete disassembly of a
discarded product. Next, usable parts are cleaned, refurbished, and put into inventory. The product
is then reassembled from the old parts—and sometimes with new parts as well—to produce a unit
that is fully equivalent and sometimes superior in performance and expected lifetime to the original
new product. 
In the United States, remanufacturing has become important mainly because of two reasons.
First, on the regulatory side, in an attempt to mitigate adverse environmental consequences, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken some concrete steps. In this regard, it is worth
highlighting the agency’s implementation in 1995 of the “Comprehensive Procurement Guideline.”
Inter alia, this guideline sought to reduce waste and promote resource conservation by ensuring that
materials collected in recycling programs would be used again to manufacture new products.4
Second, there are the actual cost savings experienced by firms. In this regard, consider the following
two examples from Mitra and Webster (2008). According to these researchers, in 1997, Ford
avoided the disposal of more than 67,700 pounds of toner cartridges and hence saved $180,000 in
disposal costs. Similarly, in 1995, Union Carbide saved $75,000 by avoiding disposal costs. Given
the growing salience of remanufacturing from both an environmental and a practical perspective,
a burgeoning literature has now begun to analyze the properties and the desirability of this industrial
4process from a variety of vantage points. We now briefly survey this literature. 
1.2 Review of the literature
Lebreton and Tuma (2006) look at remanufacturing in the context of the disposal of 600,000
tons of used tires in Germany. On the basis of their analysis, these authors point to specific factors
that are likely to raise remanufacturing rates in this nation. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) study
the competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent operator
(IO). In a multi-period setting, the IO may intercept cores of products made by the OEM to sell
remanufactured products in future time periods. These authors show that when the threat of
competition increases, the OEM is more likely to completely utilize all available cores and offer the
remanufactured product itself, at a lower price.
Mitra and Webster (2008) study the effects of government subsidies in a two-period model
of competition in which a manufacturer makes and sells a new product in the first period but
competes with a remanufacturer in the second period. They show that subsidy sharing creates
incentives for the manufacturer to design a product that is more appropriate for remanufacturing and
also to be more open to attempts to increase the return rate of end-of-life products. Atasu et al.
(2008) demonstrate that in the presence of competition, remanufacturing can become a cogent
marketing strategy in which a manufacturer can defend its market share via price discrimination.
Do remanufactured products cannibalize new product sales? Atasu et al. (2010) examine this
question and point out that a product portfolio that includes both new and remanufactured products
can make it possible for a firm to reach additional market segments and thereby block competition
from new low-end products or third-party remanufacturers. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2010)
characterize the optimal pricing and remanufacturing strategy of a monopolist that produces both
5The literature frequently uses the term “original equipment manufacturer” or OEM to refer to a new good producer.
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new and remanufactured goods. 
New and remanufactured goods are often sold in the same market and therefore it makes
sense to consider them together in the design of a product line. Aydin et al. (2015) adopt this
perspective and propose a new methodology that enables them to compute the maximum profit and
the market share associated with a product line. Finally, Shi et al. (2015) study the stability of the
Nash equilibrium arising in the game between an OEM and a remanufacturer. They show that a
higher willingness-to-pay (WTP) on the part of consumers can either strengthen or weaken the
stability of the pertinent Nash equilibrium. Even so, a higher WTP always hurts the OEM and
benefits the remanufacturer. 
The various studies discussed in this section have certainly advanced our understanding of
remanufacturing from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Even so, to the best of our
knowledge, there are no theoretical studies that have analyzed the competitive interaction between
a new good producer5 and a remanufacturer when the goal of both firms is to use expenditures on
product development to capture a dominant share of the market in which they are operating. 
Given this lacuna in the literature, in our paper, we analyze the duopolistic interaction
between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who compete for a dominant share of the market
for a particular product. Section 2 delineates the game model in which each firm  spends  on
product development to sway consumers and this expenditure increases the likelihood that firm 
captures a dominant market share. In addition, the revenue accruing to each firm from capturing a
dominant market share is  Next, given the two product development expenditures 
6section 3 states the expected profit for each firm  Section 4 describes the function that
characterizes each firm’s best response function. Section 5 computes the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game between the new good producer and the remanufacturer. Section 6 shows what happens
to this Nash equilibrium when the revenue amount  increases. Section 7 examines what happens
to the Nash equilibrium when the remanufacturer’s revenue from capturing a dominant market share
is still  but the new good producer’s corresponding revenue is  where  Finally, section 8
concludes and then discusses two ways in which the research described in this paper might be
extended.
2. The Theoretical Framework
Consider two firms—a new good producer and a remanufacturer—that are competing with
each other for a dominant share of the market for a particular good such as a toner cartridge. In what
follows, without loss of generality, the new good producer is firm 2 and the remanufacturer is firm
1. Each firm  spends  on product development. The purpose of this expenditure is to
influence consumers positively and to thereby make it more likely that this  firm will end up
capturing a dominant share of the underlying market. Note that we are using the notion of
expenditures on product development broadly and hence this term includes expenditures on a
number of things including, but not limited to, research and development (R&D), compliance with
existing regulations, and advertising.
Given a pair of product development expenditure choices  the probability that firm 
captures a dominant share of the underlying market is given by  If neither firm incurs any
expenditure on product development then we suppose that each firm captures a dominant market
7share with probability  The revenue accruing to each firm from obtaining a dominant market
share is given by  and the cost of spending  on product development is given simply by 
We now specify the expected profit function for each firm  
3. The Expected Profit Functions
Recall that the product development expenditure amounts  are given. Therefore, given
the description of revenue and cost in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that firm  expected
profit function  is given by 
(1)
Our next task in this paper is to delineate the function that characterizes each firm’s best response
function. 
4. The Best Response Functions
Firm 1 maximizes its expected profit function given in equation (1) above. Mathematically,
it solves
(2)
8The first order necessary condition for an optimum is
(3)
Let  denote firm  (remanufacturer’s) best response function. Then, this best
response function solves an equation derived from the optimality condition given in equation (3).
Specifically, we get
(4)
Inspecting equation (4), it is clear that this is a quadratic equation and therefore it is not possible to
write firm 1's best response function explicitly. However, since both firms are symmetric in our
analysis, following a procedure similar to that we have followed thus far, it is straightforward to
verify that firm  (new good producer’s) best response function is given by 
(5)
Let us now solve for the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between the new good producer and
the remanufacturer. 
5. The Nash Equilibrium
Inspecting equations (4) and (5) we see that the two best response functions are symmetric
mirror images of each other. From this observation, it follows that these two best response functions
must have a symmetric solution in which  is the unique Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game
9that we are analyzing. Given this finding, we can set  in either equation (4) or (5) and this
substitution gives us 
(6)
The solution to equation (6) is  and hence the unique Nash equilibrium of the duopoly
game between the new good producer and the remanufacturer has expenditures on product
development given by
(7)
In words, the above Nash equilibrium tells us that in the “capture dominant market share” game that
we have been studying thus far, it is optimal for both the new good producer and the remanufacturer
to spend one-quarter of the revenue obtained from capturing a dominant market share on product
development. We now show what happens to this Nash equilibrium when the revenue amount 
increases. 
6. Impact of an Increase in Revenue
Inspecting equation (7), it is straightforward to confirm that as the revenue from the capture
of dominant market share  rises, it makes sense for both the new good producer and the
remanufacturer to spend more on product development. In other words, as the stakes of the prize
(dominant market share) rise, it becomes more valuable for both firms to compete for it. 
Thus far in our analysis, we have treated the new good producer and the remanufacturer as
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symmetric players. Therefore, in the penultimate section of this paper, we consider the case in which
the two firms under study are asymmetric players. Specifically, we now want to know what happens
to the above Nash equilibrium when the remanufacturer’s revenue from capturing a dominant market
share is still  but the new good producer’s corresponding revenue is  where  
7. The Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium
Because the revenue multiplicative factor for the new good producer or  the two best
response functions that we shall now work with are asymmetric. In particular, firm
(remanufacturer’s) best response function is still given by equation (4). However, firm  (new good
producer’s) best response function is now no longer given by equation (5) but instead by 
(8)
Let us subtract equation (8) from equation (4). This gives 
(9)
Inspecting equation (9), it is clear that the Nash equilibrium of interest will now be
asymmetric and, in addition, that we will have  in this equilibrium. This last observation
makes intuitive sense because the new good producer’s revenue from capturing a dominant market
share exceeds the corresponding revenue for the remanufacturer. 
Using equation (9) to substitute for  in equation (4), we get 
(10)
Simplifying equation (10), we see that the remanufacturer’s optimal expenditure on product
development satisfies
11
(11)
where the inequality follows from the fact that  Now, using equations (9) and (11), we see that
the new good producer’s optimal expenditure on product development satisfies
(12)
where, once again, the inequalities arise because  Combining the results from equations (11)
and (12), we see that in this asymmetric Nash equilibrium, the optimal product development
expenditures for the new good producer (firm 2) and the remanufacturer (firm 1) satisfy
(13)
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the “capture dominant market share” game studied in
section 5, it was optimal for both the new good producer and the remanufacturer to spend one-
quarter of the revenue obtained from capturing a dominant market share on product development.
In contrast, when the new good producer’s revenue from capturing a dominant market share exceeds
the corresponding revenue for the remanufacturer, there is an asymmetric Nash equilibrium in which
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the new good producer optimally spends more and the remanufacturer optimally spends less than
the symmetric Nash equilibrium amount of one-quarter of the revenue or  This completes our
analysis of the competition for dominant market share between a new good producer and a
remanufacturer. 
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the game-theoretic interaction between a new good producer and
a remanufacturer who competed for a dominant share of the market for a specific product. As a
result of this analysis, we first specified the expected profit function for each firm, taking as given
the two product development expenditures. Second, we described the function that characterized
each firm’s best response function. Third, we computed the unique Nash equilibrium. Fourth, we
studied  what happened to this Nash equilibrium when the revenue from the capture of a dominant
market share increased. Finally, we examined an asymmetric Nash equilibrium with differential
amounts for the revenue accruing to each firm from the capture of a dominant market share. 
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what
follows, we suggest two possible extensions. First, it would be useful to analyze a repeated game
model of the competition between a new good producer and a remanufacturer in which the capture
of a dominant market share is a dynamic phenomenon. Second, it would also be instructive to study
a price leadership game in which a new good producer—and the price leader—interacts with
multiple, heterogeneous remanufacturers who take the price leader’s action as given. Studies that
analyze these aspects of the underlying problem will provide additional insights into the industrial
organization of markets with remanufacturing and the ways in which such markets ought to be
viewed by policy makers seeking to promote the conservation of scarce resources. 
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